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ABSTRACT  
This thesis aims to reveal the magnitude of the income elasticity of health expenditure 
and the impact of non-income determinants of health expenditures in the Canadian 
Provinces. Health can be seen as a luxury good if the income elasticity exceeds unity 
and as a necessity good if the income elasticity is below unity. The motivation behind 
the analysis of the determinants of health spending is to identify the forces that drive 
the persistent increase in health expenditures in Canada and to explain the disparities 
in provincial health expenditures, thereby to prescribe sustainable macroeconomic 
policies regarding health spending. Panel data on real per capita GDP, relative price of 
health care, the share of publicly funded health expenditure, the share of senior 
population and life expectancy at birth have been used to investigate the determinants 
of Canadian real per capita provincial total, private and government health 
expenditures for the period 1975-2002. Dynamic models of health expenditure are 
analyzed via Generalized Instrumental Variables and Generalized Method of Moments 
techniques. Evidence confirms that health is far from being a luxury for Canada and 
government health expenditures are constrained by the relative prices. Results also 
cast doubt upon the power of quantitative analysis in explaining the increasing health 
expenditures. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis aims to reveal the magnitude of the income elasticity of health 
expenditure and the impact of non-income determinants of health expenditures in the 
Canadian provinces. Health can be seen as a luxury good if the responsiveness is 
sensitive to income changes (i.e. the income elasticity exceeds unity) and as a 
necessity good if the responsiveness is insensitive to income changes (i.e. the income 
elasticity is below unity). This concept was used by Newhouse (1977)1. Another 
interpretation of this notion can be found in Kyriopoulos and Souliotis (2002):  
“If the income elasticity of health expenditure is less than one, then the public 
health sector does not have a high priority among the goals for social and 
economic development.” 
The motivation behind the analysis of the determinants of health spending is to 
identify the forces that drive the persistent increase in health expenditures in Canada 
and to explain the disparities in provincial health expenditures, thereby to prescribe 
sustainable macroeconomic policies regarding health spending. Further, identifying 
the effects of income and institutional factors on public and private health 
expenditures allows inference about the trends in the public-private mix in Canadian 
health sector. The structure of this mix has been the centre of the debate of whether 
increasing centralization or privatization would yield more efficient outcomes2. 
Although inferences are being made regarding the trends in the public-private mix of 
Canadian health expenditures, assessing the efficiency of single or two-tier health 
systems is beyond the scope of the thesis.  
                                                 
1 The term “luxury” coined by Newhouse (1977) may sound as if health is “bad” rather than 
“good”. This term is used to indicate that the elasticity is greater than one without referring to health 
being literally a “luxury”. 
2 Di Matteo (2000) provides an excellent discussion on the public-private mix of Canadian health 
expenditures. 
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Estimating the impact of income and other measures on health spending forms 
the basis of this analysis. If in fact the income elasticity of health spending is less than 
one, then health expenditures would increase at a lower rate than GDP and the public 
health sector must not have high priority among the goals of economic and social 
development. Income elasticity below unity further implies that health is a necessity 
good and thus the delivery of health is determined according to needs3. To address 
these issues, this thesis focuses on the demand side of health care and on the 
determinants that are quantitative in nature rather than factors that measure the quality 
of life and health. Conclusions drawn from a demand approach aim to answer the 
following questions: 
• 
• 
• 
                                                
Is health care in Canada a necessity or a luxury good? 
How important are the demand measures in explaining provincial health 
expenditures? 
Can demand measures be effective in order to control health spending?  
Issues that are not considered in this analysis consist of production, supply factors, 
cost efficiency and medical technology among others.  
 
1.1 Canadian Regional Health Expenditures at a Glance 
The real per capita total and private health expenditures are shown in Figure 1.1 
and 1.24. Real per capita total health expenditures have shown an increasing trend until 
1992, reaching an average of 2,400 dollars. Between 1975 and 1996 the average 
growth rate of the Canadian per capita total health spending was around 2.8%. The 
increase in health spending halted between 1992 and 1996. The Canadian average5 
growth rate in this period was slightly below zero. The flattening of real per capita 
total health expenditures in this period was caused by the economic downturn and the 
 
3 See Di Matteo (2003). 
4 In this section, the graphs are analyzed regionally for the exposition but the data is analyzed at 
the provincial level. 
5 Section 1.1 commonly refers to the Canadian averages but to keep things simple they are not 
shown on the graphs. 
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increasing public deficit resulting in cuts in health expenditures6. After 1996, total 
health spending soared with an average growth of 4.4% and rose above 3,000 dollars 
by 2002. The Atlantic Provinces have the lowest and British Columbia has the highest 
per capita spending on health. 
 
Figure 1.1: Real per capita total health expenditures 
1200.0
1400.0
1600.0
1800.0
2000.0
2200.0
2400.0
2600.0
2800.0
3000.0
3200.0
1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002
19
92
 $
Atlantic QC ON Prairies BC
 
Source: Derived by dividing provincial total health expenditures (taken from National Health Expenditure 
Database, Canadian Institute for Health Information table B.1.1) by total population and deflated by the 
CPI (Statistics Canada tables 051-0001 and 326-0002 respectively). 
 
 
Until mid 1990s, there were slight variations in per capita private health 
spending across provinces. British Columbia and Ontario have had per capita private 
health spending above those of the rest of the provinces. However, in 1991 the 
provincial private health spending clustered with the exception of Ontario where the 
private health spending kept its steady rise thereafter. By 1997, the amount of per 
capita private health spending equalized across the Atlantic Provinces, the Prairies, 
                                                 
6 See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2001 report, “Policy 
Brief: OECD Health at a Glance - How Canada Compares” 
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Quebec and British Columbia, reaching 650 dollars on average. Ontario is the 
province with the highest per capita private health spending of over 1,000 dollars. 
 
Figure 1.2: Real per capita private health expenditures 
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Source: Derived by dividing provincial private health expenditures (Canadian Institute for Health Information 
table B.2.1) by total population and deflated by the CPI (Statistics Canada tables 051-0001 and 326-0002 
respectively). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3 and 1.4 displays the total and private health expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP. Quebec, Ontario, Prairies and British Columbia devote a share to 
total health expenditures below the Canadian average whereas the Atlantic Provinces 
devote a larger share of provincial GDP in both figures. For private health 
expenditures in the Atlantic Provinces, this share suddenly rose in 1976 and peaked at 
3.7% by 1980 (see Figure 4). The steady growth of real per capita private drug 
expenditure in the Atlantic Provinces appears to be one of the causes of rising share of 
private health expenditures out of GDP until 1980. Between 1976 and 1980, the 
growth rate of real per capita private drug expenditure in the Atlantic Provinces was 
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8.7%. But this growth of private drug expenditure was only 2.2% between 1981 and 
2001. 
 
Figure 1.3: Total Health Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP (%) 
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Source: Derived by dividing provincial total health expenditures (Canadian Institute for Health 
Information, table B.1.1) by provincial GDP (Statistics Canada, table 384-0001). 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Private Health Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP (%) 
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Source: Derived by dividing provincial private health expenditures (Canadian Institute for Health 
Information, table B.2.1) by provincial GDP (Statistics Canada, table 384-0001). 
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From 1979 to 1980, total health expenditures as a percentage of GDP increased 
by more than 1% and concurrently the share of publicly funded health expenditures in 
the Atlantic Provinces reached its lowest (see Figure 1.5). The share of private health 
expenditures out of GDP in the Atlantic Provinces dropped to 2.7% by 1986. 
The share of publicly funded health expenditures7 has always been above the 
Canadian average for Quebec and the Prairies. There also has been a downward trend 
in this share in Quebec and the Prairies since late 1970’s, early 1980’s and in Ontario 
after 1992. By 2001, the highest share of publicly funded health expenditure belongs 
to Newfoundland (80.5%) and the lowest share belongs to Ontario (66.1%).  
 
Figure 1.5: Publicly Funded Health Expenditures as a Percentage of 
Total Health Expenditure (%) 
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Source: Derived by dividing provincial public health expenditures by provincial total health expenditures 
(Canadian Institute for Health Information, tables B.1.1 and B.3.1). 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Public health expenditures consist of expenditures by government and government agencies. A 
detailed content of public sector health expenditures can be found at Canadian Institute for Health 
Information website: http://secure.cihi.ca/cihiweb/dispPage.jsp?cw_page=statistics_nhex_definitions_e 
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1.2 Literature Review 
The analysis of the determinants of health expenditures (HE) has been very 
tempting for both applied econometricians and health economists. Nevertheless, there 
is no consensus on which method(s) to use, how to proceed and what type of data to 
analyze. This may have occurred due to lack of strong theoretical guidance. The 
pioneering studies emphasize the importance of national income in explaining HE 
along with a selection of non-income variables. Some of these variables are the 
relative price of health care (ratio of medical CPI to GDP price index), the proportion 
of the population over the age of 65, urbanization rate and the publicly funded 
proportion of HE among others. While the significance of non-income variables 
depends on the structure of health sector and population, GDP accounts for most of the 
variation in aggregate health care expenditure – see Parkin et al. (1987). 
Newhouse (1977) asked the question “what determines the quantity of resources 
a country devotes to medical care?” His study led to a body of literature on the 
determinants of health care expenditure. His regression of per capita medical care 
expenditure on per capita income for 13 United Nations countries yielded income 
elasticity greater than one, suggesting that health is a luxury good. The results also 
suggested that the estimated income elasticities decrease with rising income level. 
Some of the studies in the early 1990s considered cross-section analysis. 
Gbesemete and Gerdtham (1992) used cross-sectional data for 30 African countries to 
measure the effects of socioeconomic and demographic variables where per capita HE 
is a function of percentage of births attended by health staff, per capita GDP, 
percentage of the population under 15 years of age, urbanization rate, crude birth rates 
and per capita foreign aid. The results showed that only per capita GDP, percentage of 
births and per capita foreign aid were statistically significant and carried a positive 
sign. In two out of three estimated equations the coefficients of GDP were below 
unity. Gerdtham et al. (1992) investigated a similar relationship for 19 OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries using cross-
section data and generalized a model where HE is a function of national income, 
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relative price of health care, institutional factors, age structure and urbanization. The 
results indicated that the income elasticity is greater than one. Gerdtham et al. (1994) 
incorporated socioeconomic and demographic factors such as GDP, age structure, 
alcohol and tobacco consumption and female labor force participation ratio as well as 
various institutional factors, depending on the structure of health sector in 22 OECD 
countries. For all of the four models, they found that income elasticity is significantly 
below unity.  
 There is a growing panel literature on the determinants of HE in the OECD 
countries8. Those studies relied on pooled cross-section and time-series data of OECD 
member countries to partially overcome the small-sample shortcomings. Gerdtham 
(1992) used pooled cross-section and time-series data for 22 OECD countries and 
compared different models of HE including a static equilibrium model, ECM (error 
correction model) and dynamic models such as ARDL (autoregressive distributed lag), 
growth rate and partial adjustment. The results indicated that the short-run income 
elasticity is below unity whereas the long-run income elasticity of HE is around unity. 
Hitiris and Posnett (1992) analyzed the determinants of HE using a sample of 560 
panel observations for 20 OECD countries. While the results support that GDP is the 
most important determinant, they arrived at the conclusion that the income elasticity is 
larger than one. They also concluded that non-income variables are important but their 
effects on HE are small. Moore et al. (1992) specified a model for cross-country 
examination where per capita HE is a function of per capita income, per capita number 
of physicians, nurses and beds, and the ratio of public expenditures to total health care 
expenditures. The results indicated that the number of per capita beds has a negative 
effect on health care spending. They also found that health is a necessity in the short-
run while a luxury in the long-run. 
 Hansen and King (1996) employed country-by-country analysis and postulated 
that the HE-GDP relationship is spurious if the variables are not stationary9. They also 
                                                 
8 See Roberts (1999), Okunade and Karakus (2001), Di Matteo (2003) for example. 
9 See Section 3 for a discussion on stationarity and unit roots. 
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argued that a non-linear specification should not be ignored by just relying on log-
linear functional forms of HE models. Kanavos and Mossialos (1996) emphasized that 
the inclusion of national income does not reflect the society’s ability to pay. They 
argued that GDP may not be effective at all in explaining HE (their study confirmed 
that Germany, France, Ireland, Netherlands and Greece provided evidence of 
insignificance of GDP in national currency). Blomqvist and Carter (1997) used panel 
data for 18 OECD countries for the period 1960-1991 to check the common finding 
that health is a luxury good. They found out that both real per capita total health 
expenditure and income are non-stationary and cointegrated for most of the countries. 
The long-run income elasticity estimated separately for each country turned out to be 
around or greater than unity for all countries with the exception of Canada, UK and 
the USA. Pooling of OECD countries with country specific intercepts yielded an 
income elasticity close to unity. Casasnovas and Saez (1998) examined the factors 
involved in rising health care expenditures by developing a model using data for 110 
regions in eight OECD countries in 1997. They identified two sources of variation 
(within countries and between countries) to find out if the relationships between health 
care spending and the explanatory variables are country-specific. The model is 
specified as a mixed fixed and random coefficients model (MFR) by allowing the 
constant and the income parameter to differ randomly across countries where log of 
per capita health expenditure depends on log of per capita income, share of public 
health spending and the share of population over the age of 65. The results confirmed 
that the income elasticity is far less than one. They also found that increases in the 
share of public spending and share of population over the age of 65 are associated with 
increases in health spending. Hitiris (1999) examined the forces that drive the rising 
health expenditures in the G7 countries and the cost containment policies. His findings 
confirmed that income and the share of senior population explain almost 90 percent of 
the variation in health spending.  
As longer time-series of HE became available for the OECD countries, the 
dynamic properties of the relationship were captured in a data field framework. 
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Roberts (1999) concentrated on the shortcomings of the analysis of health care 
expenditure and employed techniques to analyze dynamic heterogeneous data field 
with non-stationary variables for 20 OECD countries over the period 1960-1993. She 
specified an ARDL random coefficients model to capture the heterogeneity across the 
OECD countries where total health spending is a function of income, proportion of the 
population over the age of 65, relative price of health care, the proportion of publicly 
funded health spending and a time trend which captures technological change. She 
compared mean group, pooled and cross-section estimators. In static mean group and 
pooled estimation she found evidence of significant long-run effects of income, the 
proportion of publicly funded health spending and the relative price of health care. 
Only the long-run income elasticity was significant in the dynamic mean group 
estimation. She also focused on sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of the 
results and the parameter sensitivity to country exclusion. The reported long-run 
income elasticity was above unity. In a later study Roberts (2000) addressed the 
problem of spurious regression in Hitiris’ 1997 article. She warned that the regression 
of non-stationary variables results in misleading correlation arising from the common 
trends in the data rather than the true economic relationship. Robert’s cointegration 
approach using Hitiris (1997) dataset yielded a short-run income elasticity 
significantly below unity whereas Hitiris found an income elasticity above unity. 
However, the existence of any long-run relationship between health spending and its 
determinants was unclear. Getzen (2000) argued that health care is an individual 
necessity and a national luxury in the sense that the magnitude of income elasticity 
depends on the level of analysis and researchers fail to distinguish between sources of 
variation within groups and sources of variation between groups. At the individual 
level, budget constraints do not provide sufficient information about how much to 
spent on health care as long as there is a system of pooling resources which removes 
those individual constraints. However, national constraints still exist and Getzen 
argued that the analysis should be based on the units of observation at which decisions 
are being made.  
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Okunade and Karakus (2001) employed individual ADF and IPS panel unit root 
tests, Engle-Granger and Johansen cointegration analysis for real per capita health 
expenditure, real per capita GDP and relative price of health care in 19 OECD 
countries between 1960-1997. They estimated a GDP elasticity of HE above one, 
yielding consistency with the previous estimates. A case study for the UK revealed 
that health is a luxury good with income elasticity of 1.43 and the responsiveness of 
the UK health spending to changes in the relative prices is found to be highly elastic. 
Bac and Le Pen (2002) focused on estimating a demand function by using panel data 
for 18 OECD countries by adopting a cointegration approach where per capita health 
expenditure depends on per capita GDP and the relative price of health care. They 
have found strong evidence on the cointegration of these variables and compared OLS, 
fully modified OLS (FMOLS) and dynamic OLS (DOLS) where the latter two 
estimators account for endogeneity and serial correlation. The results confirmed that 
the income elasticity of health care spending exceeds unity. Clemente et al. (2002) 
examined the stability of HE models in the OECD countries by adopting a 
cointegration approach. They criticized the stability assumption of HE-GDP 
relationship and argued that there exist structural breaks which lead to a biased and 
incorrect long-run relationship10. They conducted the analysis by disaggregating total 
expenditure as public and private health expenditure. The results suggested that the 
inclusion of structural breaks does not invalidate income elasticity of health care 
spending being greater than one.  
There exist other empirical studies in the OECD countries examining the 
cointegrating relationships and unit root problem exclusively. McCoskey and Selden 
(1998) employed country-by-country ADF tests and IPS panel data unit root tests for 
per capita HCE and GDP in 20 OECD countries and they rejected the null hypothesis 
of unit root. They also concluded that one need not be concerned about the existence 
of unit root in the OECD data. Gerdtham and Löthgren (2002) used panel data for 25 
                                                 
10 Structural break refers to jumps in the series due to sudden policy changes, wars, institutional 
or macroeconomic shocks (see Maddala and Kim, 1998). 
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OECD countries for the period 1960-1997 and presented new results on cointegration 
of HE and GDP. While the unit roots tests indicated that both HE and GDP are 
difference stationary series, they found that in 12 countries out of 25, HE and GDP 
were cointegrated. Jewell et al. (2003) presented evidence on the stationarity and the 
presence of structural breaks in HE and GDP covering 38 years for 20 OECD 
countries. The panel unit root tests with heterogeneous structural breaks suggested on 
the contrary that both HE and GDP are stationary if they allow for structural break(s).  
Di Matteo and Di Matteo (1998, henceforth DD) focused on the determinants of 
Canadian provincial government health expenditures within pooled time-series cross-
section framework for the period 1965-1991. The determinants of provincial 
government health expenditures are found to be the real per capita provincial income, 
the share of senior population and real provincial per capita federal transfers. Although 
the issue of stationarity is not fully addressed, they reported that the income elasticity 
of government health care spending is 0.77. Di Matteo (2000) examined public and 
private Canadian health expenditures over the period 1975-1996. The major 
determinants of public-private mix are per capita income, the share of individual 
income held by the top quintile of the income distribution and federal health transfers. 
Health expenditures are examined as total and sub-expenditure categories such as 
hospital, physician and drug spending. The empirical evidence suggested that 
increases in per capita income are associated with more private health care spending 
relative to public spending. In a later study Di Matteo (2003) compared parametric and 
nonparametric estimation methods for the U.S states, the Canadian provinces and the 
OECD countries. He argued that parametric approach leads to unreliable estimates of 
the income elasticity of health expenditure as it assumes a particular functional form 
and its magnitude is highly dependent on the level of analysis. International level 
analyses lead to estimates greater than one in parametric approaches. Di Matteo also 
provided evidence that the income elasticity of health spending is higher at low-
income levels and lower at high-income levels. Ariste and Carr (2001, henceforth AC) 
used provincial data on real per capita income, the proportion of the population over 
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the age of 65 and the ratio of the deficit/surplus to GDP to explain the real per capita 
government health expenditures. They examined the non-stationarity of the variables, 
the cointegrating relationships and found that variables, both individually and 
collectively, are non-stationary and possibly non-cointegrated. The determinants of 
government health expenditures are found to be income, the ratio of the deficit/surplus 
to GDP, the share of senior population and a time trend capturing technological 
progress. However the coefficient of the share of senior population appeared to be 
statistically insignificant. After concluding that all the variables are non-stationary and 
possibly non-cointegrated, they estimated a fixed effects model with non-stationary 
variables and concluded that the income elasticity of government health spending is 
0.88. Table 1 summarizes the estimates of the income elasticity of HE in both regional 
and international contexts with the basic features of the analyses.  
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 CHAPTER 2 
 
DATA AND ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY  
Few points that are not considered by DD and AC are of interest. First, if the 
relative price of health care is known to have an influence on HE (see Bac and Le Pen, 
2000 and Okunade and Karakus, 2001 for example), the failure to incorporate this 
variable as one of the determinants will ultimately lead to specification bias and 
incorrect estimates due to the combined income and price effects. It should be noted 
that the income coefficient due to the exclusion of the health price variable may be 
biased either direction11. Second, the previous studies on the determinants of Canadian 
provincial health expenditures can be characterized by lack of dynamics. Income may 
have permanent and transitory components and the increments on income may not be 
fully spent in the same period but rather its spending may be allocated through time. 
Further, current period health spending may also depend on its past values. As Roberts 
(1999) mentioned, the structure of the adjustment process of health spending is not 
well known. Getzen (2000) argues that one should expect lags on the right-hand side 
as the budget is prepared at least a year in advance. These shortcomings indicate that 
the early estimates of the determinants of Canadian health expenditures may have 
been biased and conclusions drawn could have been misleading. It is argued that the 
dynamics of health expenditures should not be neglected for the purposes of modeling 
and policy implications. Third, the determinants of provincial health expenditures are 
examined in three categories: Total health expenditures, government health 
expenditures and private health expenditures. Disaggregation allows examination of 
the differing responsiveness against the income and price changes for the government 
and private sector as well as the total health spending. Fourth, other factors that are not 
                                                 
11 The direction of this bias depends on the sign and the magnitude of income and price 
elasticities.  
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considered in previous Canadian studies are incorporated in this analysis, such as the 
life expectancy at birth and the share of publicly funded health expenditures.  
Finally, concerning unit roots, Atkins and Sidhu (2002) warned that if the series 
under consideration are not weakly stationary (i.e. the series contains at least one unit 
root) which is the case in most regional and international comparisons, then traditional 
econometric analysis is not valid. Failure to achieve weak stationarity will cast doubt 
on the statistical significance of the coefficients and their reliability. Even if economic 
theory weakly provides guidance on the relationship between HE and its various 
determinants, statistical theory shows that the mean and the variance of the underlying 
series should be time invariant (see Maddala and Kim, 1998).  
 
2.1 Data Description 
The data covers 10 provinces in Canada for the time period 1975-2002. 
However, only the observations between 1979 and 1999 are used in order to have a 
balanced panel12. The provincial total, the provincial private and the provincial 
government health expenditures are taken from the Canadian Institute for Health 
Information (CIHI) website13. These variables are deflated by the provincial CPI 
(1992=100) and divided by the provincial population to obtain real per capita 
provincial total (h), real per capita provincial private (pr) and real per capita provincial 
government (g) health expenditures. The share of publicly funded health expenditure 
(s) is obtained by dividing public health expenditures by total health expenditures. The 
provincial medical CPI (1992=100), provincial proportion of the population over the 
age of 65 (p65), life expectancy at birth (x) and the provincial GDP are collected from 
CANSIM14. The provincial GDP is deflated by the provincial CPI (1992=100) and 
divided by the provincial population to obtain the real provincial per capita GDP (y). 
                                                 
12 All variables used in this analysis cover the period of 1975-2002 with the exception of life 
expectancy at birth and the relative price of health care which cover the period of 1979-1999 and 1979-
2002 respectively. 
13 http://secure.cihi.ca/cihiweb/dispPage.jsp?cw_page=statistics_results_source_nhex_e 
14 CANSIM table numbers are 384-0003, 102-0025, 326-0002, 051-0001, 384-0001. 
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The provincial medical CPI is divided by the provincial GDP price index (1992=100) 
to obtain the relative price of health care (r) for each province.  
A couple of points need to be discussed in order to explain why the panel 
framework has been chosen. The first reason is the gain in sample size due to pooling 
of cross-section and time-series observations. This relatively large sample contains 
more information about the relationship between health expenditures and its 
determinants, allows investigation of dynamics and the disparities in provincial health 
spending, introduces more efficiency and more degrees of freedom. However, pooled 
estimation brings some issues. Dynamic pooled estimation, as will be shown in 
subsequent sections, requires some type of instrumental variable technique. In 
international comparisons, the pooled cross-section and time-series raised questions 
regarding the validity of homogeneity of health care demand functions, convertibility 
in unit of measurement and data comparability. These problems are less pronounced  
in a provincial comparison because of a unified health system across provinces and 
consistent data collection. 
The outline of this thesis is as follows: Section 2.2 addresses the issue of non-
stationarity with province-by-province and panel unit root tests. Section 2.3 introduces 
the dynamic health expenditure models and investigates the reasoning behind the 
relationship between health spending and its selected determinants. Chapter  3 
discusses the results and the relevant policy implications. Chapter 4 summarizes the 
findings and concludes with directions for future research.  
 
2.2 Province-by-province and Panel Unit Root Tests 
Unit root is a severe problem in the sense that if the appropriate tests are not 
employed, the inferences drawn might possibly be misleading and “seemingly good” 
results may occur because of a common trend rather than true economic relationship 
(see Granger and Newbold, 1974). A model should be treated and interpreted over 
stationary forms of the variables. A common problem in time series is the existence of 
unit root. Most economic time series are classified as being integrated of order d, 
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denoted as I(d), that is the series must be differenced d times in order to become 
stationary. Otherwise, regression of non-stationary variables results in spurious 
correlation. This study will first consider Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root 
test proposed by Dickey and Fuller (1979) under the null of unit root with its extension 
to panel by Im et al. (2003, henceforth IPS) and KPSS test proposed by Kwiatkowski 
et al. (1992) under the null of stationarity with its extension to panel data by Hadri 
(2000). See the appendix for technical discussion on individual and panel unit root 
tests. 
The ADF and IPS results are shown in Table 2. The ADF results show that for 
most of the series of health expenditures, GDP and the share of publicly funded health 
expenditures, the null hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected. Concerning total 
health expenditures, the null can only be rejected for New Brunswick, Prince Edward 
and British Columbia. In the case of GDP, this null can only be rejected for Prince 
Edward and British Columbia. The IPS panel tbar-statistics show that all of the 
variables can be described as group stationary. It should be emphasized that 
concerning the IPS test, lag order or lag criteria greatly affects the individual unit root 
statistics in favor of rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root.  
The KPSS individual unit root tests show that for most of the series except the 
share of senior population, the null of trend stationarity cannot be rejected. However, 
Hadri’s panel unit root tests show that the null hypothesis of either level or trend 
stationary can be rejected for all the series at the 5% significance level. This result 
might be induced from the fact that the test proposed by Hadri is valid under 
sequential limit in which ∞→T  followed by ∞→N . The results are displayed in 
Table 3.  
The first problem that appears in unit root testing is whether to include a time 
trend. While Hansen and King (1998) claimed that ADF regression should include a 
linear trend, McKoskey and Selden (1998) argued that it should not. This paper argues 
that most macroeconomic variables have tendency to increase over time, therefore it is 
appropriate to include a deterministic component into unit root testing. However, some 
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variables may not evolve around a trend component at all, yet may appear stationary. 
Economic theory does not help as to whether include a linear trend or not. At this 
point, we should rely on the statistical significance of the linear trend in unit root tests. 
The inclusion of such deterministic components is more or less heuristic.  
Karlsson and Löthgren (2000) warned that unit root test such as IPS has high 
power in panels with large T and researchers might mistakenly conclude that the 
whole panel is stationary even though most of individual series are nonstationary. The 
converse is true if T is small. This argument is reconciled for both unit root tests that 
are undertaken. The decision concerning unit roots is inconclusive. For the IPS test, a 
significant fraction of the series is individually nonstationary but they appear to be 
stationary as panel. However, for Hadri’s test a significant fraction of the series is 
individually stationary but they all appear to be nonstationary as panel. A careful 
assessment of individual and panel unit root tests should be undertaken to identify the 
order of integration of the variables with confidence. However, this is beyond the 
scope of this paper. It should be underlined that the presence of structural breaks is not 
considered by the unit root tests due to short time span of the series. 
Our primary concern is whether or not the relationship between the Canadian HE 
and its determinants would be spurious if one analyzes this relationship in levels of the 
variables. From an economic point of view, shocks to the Canadian health sector have 
temporary effects rather than effects that alter the level of expenditure permanently. 
Thus, this analysis will proceed by assuming that the panel is weakly stationary and 
that the regression is unlikely to be spurious in level. Further, even if this is not the 
true case, any indication of spurious regression can be captured by the estimation 
results. 
 
2.3 Dynamic Models of Health Expenditure 
2.3.1 Factors Affecting Health Expenditure 
Before introducing the models, this section discusses the reasons behind the 
inclusion of the selected factors into the analysis of provincial health expenditures. 
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The studies on the determinants of health expenditures argued that income is the 
major explanatory factor of HE15. The economic approach argues that other things 
being equal, the amount of health expenditure should depend on what an individual is 
capable of spending. Therefore it is expected that provinces with higher income should 
spend more on health taking other factors as given16. Figure 2.1 displays the provincial 
real per capita GDP. Differences in the provincial GDP should be taken into account 
when analyzing health expenditures as the Atlantic Provinces have much lower 
income levels compared to the rest of Canada. Alberta is the wealthiest province with 
real per capita income around 33,000 dollars on average followed by Ontario and 
British Columbia.  
 
Figure 2.1: Real per capita GDP ($) 
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Source: Derived by dividing provincial GDP by total population and deflated by the CPI (1992=100). Statistics 
Canada tables 384-0001, 051-0001 and 326-0002. 
 
 
                                                 
15 See Newhouse (1977) and Parkin et al. (1987) for example. 
16 If individuals spend more on health as income rises, the aggregate expenditure on health 
consists of sum of N such individuals. However, it is argued that macro and micro outcomes are 
generally different due to insurance or pooling of resources or other factors in which case micro 
constraints may exist but macro constraints may not. These micro and macro disparities may render 
different or inconsistent outcomes. See Getzen (2000) for a discussion on individual versus aggregate. 
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Spending decisions concerning health are not solely affected by the income level 
but also by the price of health care. Especially in the case of higher out-of-pocket 
payments, decisions rely on the price level. On one hand the government is heavily 
involved into the delivery of health and its supervision. On the other hand, health care 
has special characteristics that are different than those of other “goods”. Such features 
pose problems about our expectations of the magnitude of the price effect and its 
sign17. This variable is particularly included into the analysis to separate income and 
price effects. From the economic point of view, the failure to include the price 
variable, if effective, results in misleading inference regarding policy prescriptions. 
The relative price of health care in the Prairies has been the lowest across Canada, 
increased between 1981 and 1993 with an average growth rate of 1.7% in that period. 
Figure 2.2 clearly shows that the medical CPI was growing faster than the overall 
price level until early 1990s. This was expected considering the burden of the cost of 
medical technology and the labor intensity in health care sector. 
 
Figure 2.2: Relative Price of Health Care 
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Source: Derived by dividing provincial medical CPI by provincial GDP price index. Statistics 
Canada tables 326-0002, 384-0003. 
                                                 
17 The first counter-argument to its inclusion is that the consumers never face prices for the 
health services they receive and therefore this variable may be completely irrelevant for the analysis. 
Secondly, price of health is heavily subsidized in Canada so that even its effect is not zero, it should be 
almost zero or negligible. 
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With few countries as exceptions18, health care decisions and a considerable 
volume of health spending are driven by the governments and public institutions. 
Therefore, we expect the share of publicly funded health expenditure to affect 
health spending. If this share is effective in explaining the private heath spending, then 
inferences can be made regarding the interaction between public and private spending. 
However, as Roberts (1999) pointed out, both theory19 and empirical evidence are 
contradictory regarding the magnitude and the sign of this effect.  
The share of senior population is considered to be another explanatory factor 
of HE. The elderly population consumes health at a higher rate than others and the 
depreciation rate of health is an increasing function of age (see Grossman, 1972). 
Especially for those over the age of 65, higher and prolonged periods of cost are 
involved. The treatment of senior’s population involves complexity and the elderly 
patients are not completely cured in most of the cases. Diabetes, cardiovascular 
diseases are just a few examples that require relatively technical knowledge and 
equipment for treatment and diagnosis. The delivery of health services to an elderly 
population is therefore associated with higher spending on health. However, a recent 
study at the individual level by Felder et al. (2000) presented evidence that people tend 
                                                 
18 The obvious example is the United States where the government has a smaller role in health 
sector in comparison to Canada.  
19 If T, G and P denote the real total, public and private health expenditures respectively and 
since T = G+P the share of publicly funded health expenditures can be defined as: 
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The theory shows that the sign of this effect is always positive and the higher the private HE the greater 
the effect of ψ . Therefore, if the empirical evidence is consistent with the theory we would expect this 
effect to be positive. See Casasnovas and Saez (1998), Hitiris (1999) and Roberts (1999) for empirical 
evidence on the magnitude of this effect. 
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to spend more on health in their last 2 years of lives before death and within this 
period health expenditures decrease with age for individuals over the age of 65. 
 
Figure 2.3: The Share of Senior Population (%) 
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Source: Derived by dividing the population over the age of 65 by the total population. Statistics Canada table 
051-0001. 
 
 
From 1975 until the end of 1980’s, the average growth rate of the share of senior 
population across Canada was around 2%. But this growth has been slowed down, 
even turned negative in British Columbia towards the beginning of 1990’s. However, 
the Canadian population consists of a growing share of the elderly, representing 12-
13% of the population in 2002.  
The relationship between HE and health status indicators is controversial20. The 
reason to include a health status indicator is to identify whether there exist a 
correlation between expenditure and health level. Life expectancy at birth is an 
appropriate measure of indicator of health status for Canada. Life expectancy at birth 
                                                 
20 The studies showed that there is no correlation between HE and health status in the OECD 
countries (Kyriopoulos and Souliotis, 2002). However, a study in the United Kingdom provided 
evidence of correlation between the total health spending as a percentage of GDP and infant mortality 
rate (Maxwell, 1981).  
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simply gives the average number of years a new-born baby is expected to live. It is 
used as a proxy measure for health status, given the mortality risks21. However, the 
shortcoming of this variable is that it measures quantity rather than the quality of 
life22. A recent cross-sectional study of the determinants of health expenditures by 
Chern et al. (2002) using structural equation modeling revealed that health status and 
prior utilization of health services have considerable predictive power for future health 
spending.  
A distinction should be made between the effects of variables that represent 
demographic structure and health status. An increasing share of senior population 
implies increasing health expenditures due to higher costs of treatment of the elderly. 
However, increasing life expectancy or health status is associated with long-term care. 
Theoretically or intuitively, the sign of this effect is ambiguous. If marginal increases 
in health status increase health expenditures, this would imply that more expenditure 
on health care is needed to make people live longer. However, if marginal increases in 
health status decrease health expenditures, the cost of maintaining previous levels of 
health decreases as the health condition of the society improves. This situation leads to 
less need for health care and thus less expenditure on health care. 
Table 2.4 displays the life expectancy at birth for the period 1975-1999. Life 
expectancy at birth in Canada has increased by 4 years on average within the last 20 
years, reaching almost 80 in 1999. The average provincial growth rate of life 
expectancy at birth ranges between 0.2 and 0.3 percent, showing very similar trends 
across provinces.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 See World Health Organization website for a list of core indicators of health status. 
http://www.euro.who.int/eprise/main/WHO/Progs/CHE/Monitoring/20020802_5?PrintView=1& 
22 See Statistics Canada (2003) Health Indicators, 82-221 XIE., no: 2 
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Figure 2.4: Life Expectancy at Birth (years) 
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Source: Statistics Canada table 102-0025. 
 
 
2.3.2 Preliminaries 
This section presents the dynamics of provincial health expenditures. One-way 
fixed effect error component models are considered due to our focus on the provincial 
differences in health expenditures rather than differences across time. It is first 
assumed that these differences can be captured by the differences in the endowments.  
 
The dynamic models considered are of such form: 
 
itittiit Xhh εβρα +++= − '1,                  (2.1) 
with  itiit υµε +=                   (2.2) 
i denotes the province, i = 1,…,N and t denotes time, t = 1,…,T, β is a K x 1 
vector where K is the number of explanatory variables, Xit is the itth observation on K 
regressors, µi is the province specific effect and υit is the stochastic disturbance term. 
The following assumptions have been made: 
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Assumptions 
i. hi0 is fixed. 
ii. µi ~ IID (0, ) 2µσ
iii. υit ~ (0, ) 2iσ
iv. ( ) 0' ≠ititXE υ  
v. ittiit u+= −1,ϕυυ  1<ϕ and uit ~ IID (0, ) 2uσ
vi. ( ) ( ) ∞<∞< 22 ; itit XEhE  
 
(i) is the initial condition that starts up the process in (2.1). This assumption is 
standard in the dynamic panel literature. (ii), (iii) and (iv) assume homoscedastic 
individual effects, cross-section heteroscedastic errors and failure of orthogonality or 
strict exogeneity for a subgroup of regressors respectively, (v) allows errors to follow 
an AR (1) process due to possible through-time-allocated effects of shocks to the error 
term23 and (vi) assumes covariance stationarity. Further, the initial conditions are 
assumed to be fixed. 
In vector form, (2.1) and (2.2) can be written as: 
 
εβραι +++= − Xhh NT 1                  (2.3) 
and υµε µ += Z                   (2.4) 
 
),,,,,,,,,( 1221111
'
NTNTT εεεεεεε KKKK=
,( 1
' µµ =
are the stacked errors, h is NT x 1, 
X is NT x K, ιNT is NT x 1 vector of ones, Zµ is NT x N matrix of individual dummies 
to be used in fixed effects estimation and .  ), NµK
 
Substituting (2.4) into (2.3): 
                                                 
23 Ignoring homoscedastic and/or serially correlated errors yields consistent but inefficient 
estimates and biased standard errors. 
 25
υµδυµβραι µµ ++=++++= − ZZZXhh NT 1               (2.5) 
where [ ]1,, −= hXZ NTι  and [ ]'''' ,, βραδ =  
 
Equation (1) is treated under cross-section heteroscedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation between residuals for province i and j such that: 
 
( ) ijtjtit ZE συυ =  
( ) 0=tjtis ZE υυ  for all i, j, t, s  with t s≠  
 
The residual covariance is to be estimated using GLS weighting analogous to the 
covariance across cross-sections in a seemingly unrelated regression framework. In 
this case the covariance matrix can be written as: 
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2.3.3 Generalized Instrumental Variable (TSLS) Estimation 
Arellano (2003) demonstrated that the first problem encountered in dynamic 
panels is the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term. 
Since hit is correlated with the disturbance, it follows that hi,t-1 will also be correlated 
with the disturbances through the error component even if the disturbances are not 
serially correlated. Therefore the lagged dependent variable is an endogenous variable. 
This will render biased and inconsistent OLS estimates. In fact the bias will be 
downward if ρ > 0. To overcome this problem, the estimation is done via Instrumental 
Variables (IV) where hi,t-2 is uncorrelated with the error term and appropriate as an 
instrument for hi,t-1. A second problem is the endogeneity of the explanatory variables 
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resulting in failure to satisfy the orthogonality condition which renders biased and 
inconsistent estimates. There are two variables in the dataset suspected to be 
endogenous in relation to health spending24. First, the relative price of health care can 
be thought as Granger caused by HE and therefore being predetermined rather than 
strictly exogenous. Second, life expectancy at birth as a proxy for health status is 
expected to be highly endogenous because changing health status may occur as a 
result of spending more on health care and vice-versa, suggesting that the causality 
may run from health spending to health status as well25. 
Returning to (2.5), one can obtain the generalized instrumental variable (GIV) 
estimator of δ as: 
 
 ( ) ( )hPZZPZ WWGIV 2121'12121' ˆˆˆˆˆ −−−−− ΩΩΩΩ=δ               (2.6) 
))(( '1' WWWWPW
−= is the projection matrix. 
 
Wi+, the matrix of instruments for province i is defined as (see Baltagi, 2001): 
 
                                                 
24 The endogeneity of income is not considered here and it is argued that causality runs from 
income to health spending and not the other way (see AC). 
25 The test for endogeneity initially proposed by Hausman (1978) has been generalized by Ahn 
and Low (1996, henceforth AL) to test the joint null hypothesis of exogeneity of the explanatory 
variables. To perform the AL test, the lagged dependent variable is dropped from the model to restrict 
our focus only on the joint exogeneity of the explanatory factors. After performing GLS on static (2.1) 
one can obtain the residuals, defined by GLSXh βσσε υυ ˆ)()( 2121 −− Ω−Ω= . Then define 
 and Z'1' )( µµµµ ZZZZIPIQ NTNT −−=−= TNI ιµ ⊗= where IN is an N x N identity matrix, ιΤ is a T x 1 
vector of ones, denotes Kronecker product, INT is NT x NT identity matrix and Zµ is NT x N matrix. 
The residuals obtained from the GLS regression are regressed on
⊗
X~ and X where QXX =~ and Q wipes 
out the individual effects. The LM test statistic is defined as NTR2 ~ χ2 (k) under the null hypothesis 
where k is the number of explanatory variables. 
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where x1it is strictly exogenous but x2it is not. 
 
[ ]++= NWWW ,,1 K  is the complete matrix of instruments satisfying [ ] 0' ≠ZWE ; 
[ ] 0' =υWE . 
 
2.3.4 Generalized Method of Moments Estimation  
Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggested that (2.5) can also be written in difference 
form to wipe out the individual effects. This method is further considered as a remedy 
against the above-mentioned drawback of OLS.  
 
υβρ ∆+∆+∆=∆ − Xhh 1                  (2.7) 
 
The first differenced form introduces bias and serial correlation because the lagged 
dependent variable is correlated with the first order moving average error term. 
Therefore, the IV estimation is required to consistently estimate the parameters in 
(2.7), if not efficiently, where the appropriate instrument for ∆hi,t-1 is simply hi,t-226. 
                                                 
26 Arellano (1989) suggests that using instruments in lagged level form (lngi,t-2 , lngi,t-3,...) is 
preferable to using lagged differences (∆lngi,t-2 , ∆lngi,t-3 ,…) due to smaller coefficient standard errors.  
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However, (2.5) can be estimated efficiently via Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) using orthogonal deviations transformation.  
 
 The moment conditions are: 
 ( ) 0' =isitWE υ   t = 1,…,T st ≤               (2.8) 
 
There are T such moment conditions where k is the number of instruments. 2/)1( kT +
If the instruments are weakly exogenous with respect to εit but uncorrelated with the 
individual effects, then the moment conditions reduce to: 
 
 ( ) ( ) 0'' =∆=∆ isitisit WEWE ευ   t = 1,…,T-1 st ≤              (2.9) 
where ∆υis = υis – υi,s-1 
 
If ∀ , εi it is uncorrelated with hi0 and µi and if i∀ the εit are mutually uncorrelated then 
the following moment conditions hold (see Mátyás, 1999): 
 
 ( ) 0=∆ itishE υ   t = 2,…,T s = 0,…,t – 2            (2.10) 
 ( ) 0=∆ itiTE υυ  t = 2,…,T-1              (2.11) 
where ∆υit = υit – υi,t-1 
 
(2.10) and (2.11) imply T  and T – 2 such conditions respectively. There are 
additional moment conditions implied by the stationarity assumption which are not 
stated here. (see Arellano, 2003, p: 111) 
2/)1( −T
 
The GMM estimator of (2.5) is27: 
 
                                                 
27 See Arellano (2003). 
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 [ ] [ ]( ) [ ]( )KhWWAKXhXhKWWAKXh NN '''111'''1 ,,,ˆˆ −−−−=βρ           (2.12) 
  where the weight matrix, AN has to be chosen. 
  
 The one-step weight matrix is: 
  ( ) 1'' −= WKKWAN
 
DDDK 21' )~( −Ω= , Ω~  is the estimated covariance matrix of the errors in levels, D is 
the first difference operator.  
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 The two-step GMM uses the robust choice: 
  where ( 1''' ~~ −= WKKWAN υυ ) υ~  is the one-step residuals 
 
The nature of orthogonal deviation is to take first difference and apply GLS 
transformation to remove the artificial autocorrelation caused by first differencing28. 
Using orthogonal deviations in GMM estimation wipes out the individual effects as in 
first-differencing but does not introduce serial correlation in the transformed residuals. 
Analogous to 2-step, N-step GMM which will be used for the estimation continuously 
updates the weight matrix until convergence is achieved. The criterion function is:  
 
   )
                                                
()()()( 1' δδδδ NNN fVfQ −=
 
28 See Arellano (2003, p: 17) for technical discussion on this transformation.  
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where )(δNf  are the moment conditions and V(δ) is the optimal weight matrix 
 
The continuously updated GMM (CU-GMM) solves: 
)(minargˆ δδ δ NQ=   
 
The advantage of 2-step or CU-GMM is that no prior assumption has to be made about 
the distribution of the errors and the individual heterogeneity (see Baltagi, 2001). 
 
2.3.5 Models and Specification 
Consider the following dynamic model for the government: 
 
ittiitiit rgyg lnlnln)(ln 21,1 βρβµα ++++= −      
ititit txp υλββ ++++ 43 65             (2.13) 
 
ln denotes the natural logarithm and the variable t denotes the linear time trend.  
 
The inclusion of time trend has serious implications. First, health expenditures in 
Canada tend to increase over time therefore it may be appropriate to include a linear 
trend to separate its effect on the estimated long-run coefficients. Second, without a 
trend variable in (2.13), the t-statistics can be misleading due to the common trends. 
The linear trend can also be seen as a measure that captures the technological progress. 
Technology has an important role in the rising cost of health care (see Blomqvist and 
Carter, 1997).  
From (2.13), the respective long-run income and price elasticity of government health 
expenditures are: 
 
ρ
β
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1
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β
−=Ε 1
2
,rg  
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The long-run effects of the share of senior population and life expectancy at birth 
respectively are: 
 
65
1
65
ln
65
ln
3 dp
dg
gdp
dg
dg
gd
dp
gd ×=×==β     (2.14) 
 
dx
dg
gdx
dg
dg
gd
dx
gd ×=×== 1lnln4β      (2.15) 
 
β3 represents the relative change in g (i.e. gg∆ ) resulting from a one-percentage 
point change in the share of senior population. Similarly, β4 represents the relative 
change in g resulting from a one-year change in life expectancy at birth. If the interest 
is the percentage change in g resulting from a unit change in p65 and x than the 
estimated parameters of these variables should be multiplied by 100. The elasticity of 
government health expenditures with respect to share of senior population and life 
expectancy at birth can be obtained from (2.14) and (2.15) respectively: 
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Since 
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1
3 dp
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g
×=β and 
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g
×= 14β  
 
Therefore, the elasticity for the share of senior population and life expectancy at 
birth can be obtained from (2.13). The advantage of writing the model in log-lin form 
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with respect to share of senior population and life expectancy at birth is that the 
elasticities can be evaluated at the point where it is relevant for policy.  
Equation (2.13) can be written in such form that the estimated parameters are 
direct long-run elasticities or effects. This transformation is due to Bewley (1979). 
Subtracting tig .lnρ  on both sides, (2.13) becomes: 
 
 ( ittiititiit rggyg ln)ln(lnln)(ln)1 21,1 βρβµαρ +−−++=− −  
    ititit txp υλββ ++++ 43 65  
 
dividing by (1 – ρ) gives: 
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The constant term in (2.18) can be seen as the steady-state mean for province i, if 
we let T go large. This transformation also requires IV estimation due to the 
correlation between transformed lagged dependent variable and the error term where 
lngi,t-2 is the appropriate instrument for ∆lngit. The remaining regressors in (2.18) can 
serve as their own instruments as long as they are strictly exogenous. However, it is 
expected that this is not the case. The LM test statistic for the AL test of joint 
exogeneity of the explanatory variables for the static version of (2.13) turned out to be 
far greater than χ2 (5), resulting in rejection of the null hypothesis of joint exogeneity. 
In this case, either lags of endogenous variables or external measures, given they are 
valid, can be used as instruments as long as they satisfy the orthogonality condition. 
However, finding valid instruments is an empirical problem that researchers should be 
extremely careful about. Two-period lagged value of relative prices and five period 
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lagged value of life expectancy are used as instruments to avoid correlation between 
the instruments and the error term of HE due to possible long-memory. An instrument 
is said to be weak if it fails to satisfy the orthogonality or if the relative bias of IV 
compared to OLS is above an arbitrary threshold tolerance level29.  
 
Reconsider (2.5): 
εδ += Zh                  (2.19) 
ν+Π= WZ                  (2.20) 
 
In technical terms, given the reduced form for Z the IV estimator becomes more biased 
as the concentration parameter, , gets smaller. This paper is rather 
more concerned about the correlation between the instruments and the error term of 
the HE equation because any potential instrument is more likely to be correlated with 
the error term than its failure to be correlated with the endogenous regressors
ννσ/'' ΠΠ= ZZC
30.   
 
                                                 
29 Bound et al. (1995) draw attention to the biases in IV estimator when the instruments are weak 
and argues that the IV bias decreases as the R2 between the instruments and the endogenous regressor 
increases. 
30 There is a growing literature on detecting weak instruments in IV estimation of which the test 
proposed by Stock and Yogo (2001) is considered here. If Y, X and Z denote the endogenous, 
exogenous and excluded instrument matrices in stacked form respectively and K1 and K2 denote the 
number of exogenous and the number of excluded instruments respectively the Stock-Yogo test is based 
on the minimum eigenvalue of the concentration matrix: 
  )(minmin TGeigenvalueg =
 
2
21'21 /ˆˆ
'
KYPYG ZT
−⊥⊥− ΣΣ= ⊥ νννν  
where )/()(ˆ 21
' KKTYMY Z −−=ννΣ , Y , YXXXXIYM X ))(( '1' −⊥ −==( ) 1' ()( XZXZXZXZIM Z −−= ' , , P  ) XXXXIZMZ X )(( '1' −⊥ −== Z) '' 1)( ⊥−⊥⊥⊥=⊥ ZZZZZ
The critical values of this test statistic are tabulated by simulation and they depend on the relative bias 
tolerance and the number of endogenous regressors. A gmin above the critical value implies rejection of 
null of weak instruments. Results of the Stock-Yogo (SY) test fail to reject the null hypothesis of weak 
instruments suggesting that there may be a certain degree of correlation between the instruments and the 
error term of HE equation. However, the implementation of this test in panel context is not clear since it 
is derived under time-series properties and there are additional assumptions related to the individual 
heterogeneity whose effect on the test statistic is unknown. Therefore the SY test results should be 
treated with extreme caution.   
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 CHAPTER 3 
 
RESULTS & POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The assumption made about the differences in the intercepts has been 
incorporated in the models via fixed effects31. The results show that the dynamics of 
HE should not be ignored as they play a significant role in the adjustment process of 
explanatory variables. An interesting result found is that the life expectancy at birth 
has statistically significant effect on government HE. Before analyzing the precise 
effects of those variables, we should confine ourselves to the reparameterized models 
we made use of, based on Bewley (1979), to directly estimate the average long-run 
effects of the explanatory variables. This reparameterization helps to assess the 
significance of the long-run effects and their standard errors. Table 4 reports the 
results. All factors have statistically significant long-run effects on total HE with the 
exception of the share of senior population. The long-run price elasticity of total health 
expenditure is statistically significant at 5% and carried a negative sign suggesting that 
a 1% increase in relative prices decreases total health spending by 0.12% on average32. 
The long-run income elasticity of total health expenditure is 0.36 suggesting that a 1% 
increase in per capita GDP is associated with a slower increase of total health 
expenditure around 0.36%. Consistent with the theory, the effect of the share of 
publicly funded health expenditure on total health expenditures carried a positive sign. 
But the magnitude of this effect is small. 
Concerning the government HE, all long-run effects are significant. The 
evidence suggests that the effect of the share of senior population is neither high as it 
                                                 
31 We have performed F-test to test the joint significance of the individual fixed effects under the 
null hypothesis, Ho: µ1 = µ2 = ..... = µ10 = 0. The F-test turned out to be 41.81, 22.85 and 131.70 for total, 
government and private HE respectively, resulting in favor of rejecting the null hypothesis. Therefore, 
the models can be characterized by allowing fixed effects.  
32 In his seminal work, Newhouse (1977) argued that price may not be an important factor in 
explaining health expenditures if health care are heavily subsidized. 
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is previously found by DD33, nor insignificant as argued by AC. The long-run income 
elasticity of government health expenditure is found to be 0.43. The evidence in this 
paper also indicates that the long-run effect of relative price of health care is more 
pronounced for the government with a price elasticity of -0.74. A possible explanation 
of the significance of price effect is that provincial governments face the full price of 
health services even though the cost is not projected on patients through billings. 
Regardless of this fact, the provision of public health care is not free and there are 
national constraints and long-term issues in financing of public health spending (see 
Brown, 1991).  
The health status effect on government spending is considerably large. For the 
sample period, the government health expenditures decrease by 19% as result of a one 
year increase in life expectancy34. If it can roughly be postulated that life expectancy 
at birth increases by one year on average in every 7 years in Canada, this result 
indicates a considerable shrinkage in government health expenditures, given other 
factors constant. This finding indicates that improvement in health status leads to less 
need and thus less use of health care. On the other hand, increasing life expectancy 
also implies a greater share of senior population in the long-run. As the regression 
results in Table 4 show, the negative effect of health status outweighs the positive 
effect of the aging population on government health expenditures indicating that 
despite the upward movement in government health expenditures due to increasing 
share of the elderly, improvements in health status bring net gains in terms of less 
                                                 
33 According to DD, the impact of the log of the share of the population over the age of 65 on log 
of government health expenditures is found to be 0.81 whereas AC found no evidence on its statistical 
significance. It should be noted that DD has chosen a log-log functional form with respect to p65 
whereas a log-linear functional form has been chosen in this study with respect to p65.  
34 It proved impossible to properly instrument the life expectancy at birth by its lags in the Total 
HE model. Therefore, it is thought appropriate in this situation to drop this variable from that model 
leaving its effect to remain unknown on total health spending. 
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spending35. This outweighing is one of the reasons for decreasing government health 
expenditures as a result of increasing life expectancy.  
The estimation results for private health expenditures are reported in the last 
column of Table 4. The long-run income elasticity of private health expenditures is 
found to be 0.26, lower than that of government HE. This indicates that government 
health expenditures increase faster than the private health expenditures and thus a 1% 
increase in per capita GDP is associated with increasing centralization36, ceteris 
paribus. This result contradicts the findings of Di Matteo (2000). For the relative 
prices, the long-run price elasticity is statistically insignificant. A possible reason for 
the insignificance of the price effect is that many consumers of private health care do 
not directly face full prices because of private insurance. Also in face of high private 
insurance coverage, income elasticities are close to zero (see Getzen, 2000). The 
empirical evidence presented here also confirms this argument. 
The share of publicly funded HE is included in the analysis of the private sector 
to evaluate a potential trade-off between private and public health expenditures and its 
size. The empirical evidence contradicts the a priori expectation. Our findings indicate 
a statistically significant but negative trade-off between the share of public HE and 
private HE.  
                                                 
35 The outweighing will always hold not matter what the functional form of the model is with 
respect to share of senior population and life expectancy at birth as long as the coefficients of these 
variables have the same interpretation. To show this, reconsider (2.16) and (2.17): 
65365, ppg ×=Ε β         
xxg ×=Ε 4, β       
From (2.18), the results in Table 4 for the government health expenditures model show that: 
 
34
ˆˆ ββ >  
For the sample period of 1975-2002, since the values of life expectancy at birth and share of senior 
population does not overlap, xt > p65s for [ ]20021975 −∈t∀  and [ ]20021975 −∈∀s . It follows that: 
 65365,,4 px pgxg ×=Ε>Ε=× ββ  for [ ]20021975 −∈∀t  
Even if the model is estimated such that the coefficients of the share of senior population and life 
expectancy are elasticities, the effect of health status would still outweigh the effect of the share of 
senior population. 
36 Centralization is defined as the ratio of public health expenditures to total health expenditures 
(see Di Matteo, 2000, p: 97). 
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The coefficient of trend appeared to be significant at 1% level for all three 
models. This suggests that if the remaining explanatory factors are fixed, total, 
government and private health expenditures would grow at a rate of 2% and 3.5% and 
1.6% respectively. This result may have occurred as a consequence of fast-growing 
cost of medical technology.  
The last homogenous model is estimated via GMM. It should be noted that the 
GMM estimation is designed and expected to perform well under large N small T 
environments which is not our case. The preliminary models with a full set of 
explanatory variables are first estimated and then the variables with insignificant 
parameters37 are dropped from the model in order to obtain parsimonious models and 
to increase the sample size because not all of the explanatory variables have the same 
time span. The resulting models are displayed in Table 5. The GMM estimates were 
not subject to Bewley transformation therefore the parameters should be multiplied by 
the long-run multiplier, 1/(1 – ρ) in order to obtain the long-run effects. 
The long-run income elasticity of total health spending turned out to be 0.35, 
very close to GIV estimate of 0.36. The effect of relative price of health care on total 
health spending in the GMM estimation is significant at 10% level with a price 
elasticity of -0.25 compared to -0.12 obtained via GIV. For the government, the GMM 
estimates a higher income elasticity of 0.52 and price elasticity of -0.52 compared to 
their respective GIV counterparts which are 0.43 and -0.74. However, the effects of 
the senior share and life expectancy are not significantly different from zero in GMM 
estimation. For the private sector, the GMM long-run effects of income and public 
provision are slightly higher than their GIV counterparts. The GMM long-run income 
elasticity is 0.31 and the effect of the share of publicly funded health expenditure is -
0.038. Autonomous growth in health spending is lower in GMM compared to GIV 
estimates with 1.7%, 1.3% and 2% for total, government and private health 
expenditures respectively. A summary of comparative results of GMM and GIV 
                                                 
37 These variables are the share of senior population and life expectancy at birth. 
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estimates is given in Table 6. It should be noted that both GIV and GMM estimates are 
unbiased and consistent. However, only GMM is efficient.  
The evidence in this paper confirms that health is far from being a luxury for 
Canada and the delivery of health is dominated by the needs rather than the ability to 
pay. This is what Culyer (1988) was referring to as “the Bioengineering view”. The 
“according to needs” argument is also consistent with physicians having a high-degree 
of control over the decisions about the medical services that patients need.  
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  CHAPTER 4 
 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis focused on the magnitude of income elasticity and the impact of non-
income determinants of health expenditures in Canadian provinces using panel data on 
per capita GDP, relative price of health care, the share of publicly funded health 
expenditures, share of senior population and the life expectancy at birth over the 
period 1975-2002. Under the assumption of homogenous parameters, the income 
elasticity of health expenditure is below unity. This result is consistent with previous 
studies in the sense that the regional estimates are usually below one. 
 
 The main differences captured in this study are summarized as follows: 
The relation between health expenditure and its determinants is of 
autoregressive structure. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Government health expenditures are constrained by the relative prices. 
Statistically significant effects of the share of senior population and share of 
publicly funded health expenditures are small. 
There is correlation between health spending and health status.  
 
The inclusion of time trend for statistical reasons and to capture possible changes in 
medical technology is of importance since the results provide evidence of considerable 
autonomous growth of health spending, ceteris paribus. This paper also supports the 
findings of Blomqvist and Carter (1997) that when the time trend is excluded from the 
regressions, the long-run income elasticity is higher. 
The difficulty encountered in this paper was indecision whether or not the panel 
can be described as group stationary. The IPS and Hadri’s panel unit root tests gave 
contradictory result regarding the unit root problem. Most of the panel unit root tests 
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are based on and therefore valid only under joint or sequential limit theory and 
evidence presented confirms that these tests are known to render conflicting results 
due to their high/low power in certain cases. Based on this problem, it is argued that 
the effects of shocks to Canadian public sector can be best characterized as temporary 
rather than permanent and there is no firm reason and evidence to not to follow a 
traditional analysis. However, a thorough and careful assessment of panel unit root 
problem is needed.  
A second area for future research lies in more advanced econometric techniques 
to reconsider the soundness of macroeconomic health policies regarding health 
expenditure. Cointegration approach is not followed here due to the unknown order of 
integration of the variables and short time span but one can expect to have a 
relationship at least between health spending, income and the relative price of health 
care in the long-run. After a careful assessment of unit root the cointegrating 
relationships can be examined to identify the long-run effects and the short-run 
dynamics.  
Some of the studies of health care expenditure based on the OECD health data 
argued that there are substantial differences in the structure of health sectors and 
demographics in the OECD countries. It is also argued that imposing slope 
homogeneity is unrealistic and may lead to misleading coefficients (Roberts, 1999). 
Slope heterogeneity is not considered here due to well known misleading and biased 
estimates under dynamic pooled estimation with heterogeneous parameters (Pesaran 
and Smith, 1995). Also the preliminary estimation under heterogeneity gave 
conflicting results.  
Extreme caution should be exercised when interpreting the results. The small 
sample behavior of GMM and the validity of the instruments are questionable matters 
and they indicate that some bias may have not been removed. A difficult task was to 
find a set of “clean” instruments for the variables suspected of being non-exogenous. 
Using lags of endogenous variables as instruments is a standard “remedy” in situations 
where it is almost impossible to find other “clean” instruments. Using sufficiently 
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lagged values to make them clean results in loss of sample size equal N times the 
number of maximum lagged periods used in the estimation. These trade-offs should be 
taken into account when working with single equations and adjustments should be 
made according to which type of bias one would prefer to tolerate. A fruitful 
methodology for future research this study suggests is to implement a SUR 
methodology in system of equations considering the difficulties of finding valid 
instruments under single equation models and the distinct characteristics of the public 
and private equations one might have in the system. The M-equation framework is 
known to accommodate the endogeneity of the regressors which becomes the crucial 
part of the analysis if one focuses on the qualitative determinants38 of health spending. 
What are not needed are further studies of the effects of quantitative measures on 
health expenditures. The standard measures thought to be the determinants of health 
expenditures are so far known to researchers in this area. Further, the empirical 
evidence showed that these quantitative measures increase at a slower rate than health 
expenditures and thus they help very little in explaining the rise of health 
expenditures. As Culyer (1988) pointed out, beyond the questionability of econometric 
procedures and the statistical plausibility there is something systematically incorrect 
and inadequate with the quantitative analysis of health spending. This issue brings us 
to what is known as the “ad hoc”39 feature of the analysis of health expenditures. Ad 
hoc models raise difficulties in setting sound policies especially in the developed 
countries where there are numerous empirical studies but they are limited to the 
question of whether health care is a necessity or a luxury good.  
What is not known is the precise effect of measures that are indicators of the 
quality of life and health. Proxy measures for the effectiveness of the health system, 
the quality of health services and health status can serve for such purposes, thereby 
allowing one to examine the consequences of an increase in the quality of health care 
                                                 
38 Some of those proxy measures are the quality adjusted life years (QALY’s), waiting time for 
an operation, length of stay in hospital, number of post-operation complications. 
39 The right-hand side variables are chosen intuitively or “arbitrarily” and are thought to affect 
health spending.  
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on health expenditures. Therefore, the next generation of international or regional 
comparisons of health spending should be based on the effects of qualitative measures 
that are truly responsible for the persistent increase or disparities in health 
expenditures.  
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Table 1: Estimates of Income Elasticity of Health Expenditure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: “D” and “S” denote dynamic and static models respectively.
Year Author Type of Analysis Data Source Methodology 
 
Variables  Sample  Income
elasticity 
1977 Newhouse Cross-section United Nations Linear, log-linear, 
reciprocal forms 
GDP  13 (>1)
1992 Gerdtham et al. Cross-Section    OECD Logarithmic
functional form 
 Income, relative price of health, 
age, urbanization, public provision 
& financing, share of public HE 
19 (>1)
1992       Gbesemete &
Gerdtham 
Cross-Section African
countries 
Logarithmic 
functional form 
GNP, foreign aid, crude birth rate, 
share of population under 15, 
urbanization rate 
30 Around 1
1997        Blomqvist &
Carter 
Panel(D) OECD Nonstationarity
Cointegration 
GDP, share of senior population 
 
744 (>1)
1998    Casasnovas &
Saez 
Panel (S) OECD Random effects, 
heterogeneity 
GDP, share of senior population, 
share of public HE 
880 (<1)
1998    Dimatteo &
Dimatteo 
Panel (S) Canada Fixed effects model GDP, federal transfers, 
share of senior population 
270 (<1)
1999 Roberts Data Field  
(D, S) 
OECD      Nonstationarity
Heterogeneity 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Publicly funded HE, GDP, price of 
health, 
Share of senior population 
660 Around 1
1999 Hitiris Panel (S) G7 countries Fixed effects model, 
linear functional form 
GDP, Share of senior population, 
share of public expenditure in GDP 
217   Around 1
2001  Okunade &
Karakus 
Panel (S) OECD Nonstationarity 
Cointegration, ECM 
GDP, price of health 722 (>1) 
2001 Ariste & Carr Panel (S) Canada Nonstationarity 
Cointegration 
Fixed effects  
GDP, Share of senior population, 
ratio of deficit to GDP 
330  (<1)
2002 Clemente et al. Panel (S) EU & OECD Heterogeneity 
Nonstationarity 
Cointegration 
Structural Break 
GDP   185/333/296 (>1)
2002 Bac & Le Pen Panel (S) OECD  Nonstationarity
Cointegration  
Fixed effects 
GDP, price of health care 432 (>1) 
  
 
Table 2: Province by Province ADF τ-statistics and IPS Panel t-bar statistic 
 
 
Province Total Health Expenditure 
 
Government Health 
Expenditure 
Private Health Expenditure Share Public Health 
Expenditure 
Lag order  τ-statistic Lag order τ-statistic Lag order τ-statistic Lag order τ-statistic 
Newfoundland         
        
         
        
        
         
         
         
         
      
2 -1.841 3 -1.859 4 -1.939 3 -2.828
Prince Edward Island 2 -3.410*** 4 -1.740 2 -3.586*** 2 -3.395*** 
Nova Scotia 2 -2.012 3 -2.126 3 -2.176 3 -1.974
New Brunswick 3 -3.419*** 3 -2.821 2 -4.062** 3 -3.739**
Quebec 4 -2.551 1 -2.547 2 -2.207 2 -2.647
Ontario 2 -2.391 3 -2.361 3 -2.553 2 -1.538
Manitoba 3 -2.870 3 -2.947 3 -2.467 2 -2.255
Saskatchewan 2 -1.774 3 -2.882 2 -3.726** 3 -2.851
Alberta 2 -2.442 2 -2.417 3 -2.778 2 -2.178
British Columbia 4 -3.832** 3 -3.201 2 -2.067 2 -3.632**
Panel t – bar statistic  -2.654** -2.539*** -2.756** -2.713**
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: ADF regressions include linear trend. *, ** and *** represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The 1%, 5% and 10% critical values 
of the IPS t-bar test statistic are -2.79, -2.60 and -2.51 respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2: Province by Province ADF τ-statistics and IPS Panel t-bar statistic (cont’d) 
 
 
Province  GDP Relative Price of Health Life Expectancy at Birth Share of Senior Population 
Lag order  τ-statistic Lag order τ-statistic Lag order τ-statistic Lag order τ-statistic 
Newfoundland         
         
        
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
3 -2.364 3 -3.956* 2 -4.031** 1 -0.052
Prince Edward Island 0 -3.516*** 3 -4.402* 1 -3.486*** 2 -1.711
Nova Scotia 3 -1.723 1 -4.767* 1 -3.041 2 -3.904*
New Brunswick 0 -3.071 1 -2.101 1 -2.380 2 -2.921
Quebec 2 -2.547 1 -1.264 1 -2.864 2 -1.667
Ontario 2 -2.900 2 -1.796 1 -2.776 3 -2.749
Manitoba 3 -2.347 1 -1.522 2 -1.805 3 -2.904
Saskatchewan 2 -1.186 4 -1.852 1 -1.572 3 -1.521
Alberta 1 -2.078 2 -2.242 3 -3.220 2 -0.857
British Columbia 3 -4.082** 2 -1.892 3 -3.480*** 3 -1.619
Panel t – bar statistic -2.582*** -2.579* -2.865* -1.9905**
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:       represents that the ADF regressions do not include linear trend. *, ** and *** represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The 1%, 
5% and 10% critical values of the IPS t-bar test statistic are -2.21, -1.99 and -1.89 respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Province by Province KPSS η-statistics and Hadri’s Panel Test statistic  
 
 
Province Total Health Expenditure 
l4 = 3 
Gov. Health Expenditure 
l4 = 3 
Private Health Expenditure 
l4 = 3 
Share of Public Health 
Expenditure 
l4 = 3 
 ητ η  η  η  ηµ τ ηµ ητ µ τ ηµ 
Newfoundland         
         
        
         
        
         
         
         
         
         
         
0.112 0.780** 0.089 0.779** 0.112 0.219 0.087 0.527**
Prince Edward Island 0.066 0.790** 0.074 0.771** 0.066 0.675** 0.067 0.078
Nova Scotia 0.140 0.767** 0.125 0.741** 0.131 0.786** 0.094 0.740**
New Brunswick 0.173** 0.771** 0.161** 0.765** 0.158** 0.760** 0.100 0.648**
Quebec 0.098 0.791** 0.113 0.745** 0.095 0.776** 0.098 0.746**
Ontario 0.155** 0.774** 0.151** 0.697** 0.126 0.806** 0.143 0.690**
Manitoba 0.115 0.776** 0.108 0.734** 0.091 0.771** 0.097 0.465**
Saskatchewan 0.132 0.762** 0.133 0.686** 0.091 0.747** 0.124 0.215
Alberta 0.128 0.672** 0.130 0.463 0.057 0.794** 0.143 0.624**
British Columbia 0.100 0.795** 0.091 0.778** 0.054 0.794** 0.085 0.364
Hadri Panel Statistic 4.973** 12.78** 4.516** 11.88** 2.973** 12.40** 2.297** 8.406**
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: ητ and ηµ are the trend and the level stationarity cases respectively.  The 5% critical value of the Hadri Panel statistic is 1.645. ** denotes 5% 
significance level.  
 
 
 
  
 
Table 3: Province by Province KPSS η-statistics and Hadri’s Panel Test statistic (cont’d) 
 
 
Province GDP Relative Price of Health 
l4 = 3 l4 = 3 
Life Expectancy at Birth  
l4 = 3 
Share of senior population 
l4 = 3 
 ητ η  η  η  ηµ τ ηµ ητ µ τ ηµ 
Newfoundland         
         
        
         
         
        
         
         
         
         
         
0.089 0.677** 0.181** 0.534** 0.088 0.624** 0.098 0.805**
Prince Edward Island 0.110 0.660** 0.171** 0.615** 0.101 0.604** 0.185** 0.737**
Nova Scotia 0.167** 0.625** 0.182** 0.576** 0.133 0.643** 0.207** 0.791**
New Brunswick 0.113 0.652** 0.123 0.633** 0.166** 0.626** 0.202** 0.796**
Quebec 0.076 0.628** 0.101 0.717** 0.127 0.643** 0.153** 0.807**
Ontario 0.066 0.588** 0.139 0.709** 0.117 0.644** 0.193** 0.798**
Manitoba 0.106 0.597** 0.126 0.597** 0.153** 0.605** 0.205** 0.751**
Saskatchewan 0.158** 0.450 0.170** 0.585** 0.140 0.585** 0.147** 0.773**
Alberta 0.122 0.223 0.177** 0.566** 0.145 0.632** 0.122 0.763**
British Columbia 0.046 0.637** 0.145 0.459 0.110 0.643** 0.185** 0.749**
Hadri Panel Statistic 4.051** 11.87** 7.932** 9.01** 4.68** 9.72** 8.43** 13.14**
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Note: ητ and ηµ are the trend and the level stationarity cases respectively.  The 5% critical value of the Hadri Panel statistic is 1.645. ** denotes 5% 
significance level.
 Table 4: Direct Long-run Estimates, 1979 – 1999 
    Method: Instrumental Variables, one-way fixed effects error component model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable  Total Health Expenditures Government Health Expenditures Private Health Expenditures 
 Coefficient (s.e) p-value   Coefficient (s.e) p-value Coefficient (s.e) p-value
GDP 0.36 (0.061) 0.0000 0.43 (0.153) 0.0049 0.26 (0.059) 0.0000 
Price of Health Care -0.12 (0.056) 0.0255 -0.74 (0.195) 0.0002 0.008 (0.091) 0.9226 
Share of  Public H.E 0.003 (0.001) 0.0133 -  -0.034 (0.001) 0.0000 
Share of Senior Population -0.004 (0.008) 0.6086 0.080 (0.016) 0.0000 0.027 (0.008) 0.0019 
Life Expectancy at Birth -  -0.191 (0.068) 0.0060 -0.015 (0.030) 0.6142 
Trend 0.02 (0.001) 0.0000 0.035 (0.012) 0.0054 0.016 (0.004) 0.0003 
Change in Dependent Var. 
 
-1.87 (0.312) 0.0000 -1.74 (0.431) 0.0001 -0.35 (0.076) 0.0000 
Constants       
     
       Newfoundland 3.5527 0.0000 16.3453 0.0002 6.8802 0.0265 
       Prince Edward Island 3.6340 0.0000 16.1198 0.0002 6.8817 0.0261 
       Nova Scotia 3.5555 0.0000 16.0712 0.0002 6.8432 0.0271
       New Brunswick 3.5773 0.0000 16.1782 0.0002 6.8932 0.0265 
       Quebec 3.5099 0.0000 16.2270 0.0002 6.8814 0.0279 
       Ontario 3.5389 0.0000 16.2770 0.0003 6.9214 0.0284 
       Manitoba 3.5971 0.0000 16.1263 0.0003 6.8748 0.0273 
       Saskatchewan 3.4738 0.0000 16.0599 0.0003 6.7872 0.0294 
       Alberta 3.4033 0.0000 16.3556 0.0003 6.9083 0.0299 
       British Columbia 3.5726 0.0000 16.3759 0.0003 6.9100 0.0289 
Sample Size = 230/160/160 R2 = 0.99  
J-Statistic 0≈  
Jarque Bera = 2.999 (0.2231) 
R2 = 0.99  
J-Statistic 0≈  
Jarque Bera = 0.515 (0.7728) 
R2 = 0.99  
J-Statistic 0≈  
Jarque Bera = 0.462 (0.7936) 
Note: Two-period lagged value is used as instrument for the lagged dependent variable and the relative price of health care. Five-period lagged value is 
used as an instrument for the life expectancy. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity of any form. 
 
 
 
 Table 5: Generalized Method of Moments Estimates, 1978 – 2002 
 
Note: Two-period lags are used as instrument for the lagged dependent variable and relative price of health care. Exogenous explanatory 
variables served as their own instruments. The transformation is via orthogonal deviations, the GMM weights are Arellano & Bond n-step 
period weights and the standard errors in parentheses are robust to period heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. 
Variable  Total Health Expenditures Government Health Expenditures Private Health Expenditures 
Coefficient (s.e) p-value Coefficient (s.e) p-value Coefficient (s.e) p-value
GDP 0.10 (0.040) 0.0107 0.12 (0.044) 0.0047 0.21 (0.087) 0.0140 
Price of Health Care -0.07 (0.038) 0.0659 -0.12 (0.042) 0.0038 -  
Share of  Public H.E -  -  -0.026 (0.005) 0.0000 
Trend 0.005 (0.001) 0.0000 0.003 (0.001) 0.0002 0.014 (0.002) 0.0000 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.72 (0.048) 0.0000 0.77 (0.037) 0.0000 0.33 (0.100) 0.0011 
Sample Size = 220/220/250 
 
Adj. R2 = 0.85 
0J-Statistic ≈  
Jarque Bera = 6.358 (0.0416) 
Adj. R2 = 0.77  
0J-Statistic ≈  
Jarque Bera = 0.318 (0.8528) 
Adj. R2 = 0.91 
0J-Statistic ≈  
Jarque Bera = 0.098 (0.9518) 
    
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Comparative GIV and GMM results 
Variable Total Health Spending Gov. Health Spending Private Health Spending 
GIV CU-GMM GIV CU-GMM GIV CU-GMM
Income    
  
    
  
0.36 0.35 0.43 0.52 0.26 0.31
Relative Price -0.12 -0.25 -0.74 -0.52 insignificant insignificant
Public Share 0.003 insignificant - - -0.034 -0.038 
Senior Share insignificant insignificant 0.080 insignificant 0.027 insignificant
Health Status - insignificant 
 
-0.19 insignificant insignificant 
 
insignificant 
 Trend 0.020 0.017 0.035 0.013 0.016 0.020
  
APPENDIX 
 
A.1 Test of Null of Unit Root 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test can be shown by the following model: 
               ε∑
=
−− +∆+−++=∆
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,,1,)1( εβρδα it ~ i.i.d (0, σ2)
  
where variable t is time trend for the ith province, t = 1,……,T and  j = 1,......,K. K is 
the number of lags, determined such that the error term is autocorrelation free.  
IPS proposed a panel unit root test based on the average of the ADF test statistics: 
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where τi is the ADF test statistic for ith province.  
 
The t-bar statistic converges in probability to a standard normal variate as T  and 
.  The null hypothesis that all series contain unit roots is tested against the 
alternative that some series are stationary.  
∞→
∞→N
 
 Ho: ρi = 1  for all i 
 HA: ρi < 1  i = 1, 2, …, N1  where N1 is a subset of N 
 
Based on the theorem 3.1 in Im et al. (2003), the standardized t-bar statistic is given 
by: 
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E(τT) and var(τT) are respectively the mean and the variance of the individual ADF test 
statistic τi. The construction of the Z-statistic assumes that the individual ADF test 
statistics are iid with finite moments. However, the Z-statistic requires that, ∞→N  
and therefore cannot be used in this case. Instead, they propose a fixed T, fixed N test 
which is the t-bar statistic. But in this case, the statistic has a non-normal distribution 
and the critical values are supplied by IPS.  A particular lag order is determined for 
each of the series instead of choosing a common lag order to avoid misleading ADF 
statistics resulting from autocorrelation.  
 
A.2 Test of Null of Stationarity 
The KPSS unit root test constructs the null hypothesis of stationarity against the 
alternative of unit root. This ensures that the null will be rejected only when there is 
strong evidence against it. Due to Kwiatkowski et al. (1992), a time series can be 
decomposed into three components, a deterministic trend, a random walk and a 
stationary error: 
 titiiti rtx ,,, εθ ++=       (1) 
 
where t captures the deterministic trend and ri,t is a random walk: 
 
     utititi urr ,1,, += − i,t ~ i.i.d (0, σu2)  (2) 
 
To test the null hypothesis of trend stationarity, the estimate of the error 
variance, est. σε,i2 and the residuals, εi,t can be obtained by regressing x on a constant 
and time trend as in eq. (1). The same argument can be applied to test the null of level 
stationarity. In that case, x is regressed on a constant only. The test statistic is a one-
sided LM statistic under the null of level stationary (Ho: θi = 0) with the errors being 
iid in eq. (1). The LM test statistic is defined as: 
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where T is the sample size, is the estimate of the error variance, l is the lag 
truncation parameter
)(ˆ 2 liσ
40 and Si,t is the partial sums of the residuals, . 
Instead of adding lagged terms into the unit root regression under testing as in the 
ADF, the KPPS test makes a nonparametric correction of the estimate of the error 
variance such that: 
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The extension of the KPSS test for panel data has been proposed by Hadri (2000). The 
panel LM test statistic is defined as the mean of the individual test statistics under the 
null of level stationary: 
 
 ∑
=
=
N
i
iN
ML
1
1ˆ ηµ  
 
The null hypothesis of level or trend stationarity is tested against the alternative of unit 
root in panel. Under the assumptions that E[ui,t] = E[εi,t] = 0, ui,t and εi,t are i.i.d across 
i and over t, the test statistic has the following limiting distribution: 
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40 Lag truncation is set to integer [4(T/100)1/4] to correct the estimate of the error variance. 
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where  represents weak convergence in distribution, ξ⇒ µ , ζµ are mean and variance 
of a standard Brownian bridge . The computed numerical values of ξ∫1
0
2 )( drrV µ, ζµ are 
1/6 and 1/45 for the level case and 1/15 and 11/6300 for the trend case respectively. 
The major shortcoming of Hadri’s panel unit root test is that the test statistic does not 
remain valid under small N and moderate T.  
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